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Iterated weak dominance in strictly competitive games of perfect
information
Abstract
We prove that any strictly competitive perfect-information two-person game with n outcomes is
solvable in n−1 steps of elimination of weakly dominated strategies— regardless of the length of the
game tree. The given bound is shown to be tight using a variant of Rosenthal's centipede game.
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ABSTRACT 
 
 
We prove that any strictly competitive perfect-information two-person game with n 
outcomes is solvable in n-1 steps of elimination of weakly dominated strategies – regardless 
of the length of the game tree. The given bound is shown to be tight using a variant of 
Rosenthal’s centipede game. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, 
C72. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In this paper, it is shown that any zero-sum game of perfect information with n 
outcomes is solvable by n-1 iterations of eliminating weakly dominated strategies – regardless 
of the length of the game. 
The intuition is as follows. Suppose that player i’s maximum possible payoff is uimax. 
Then, if i has a strategy ensuring uimax, this strategy is dominant and the game solves in one 
step. On the other hand, if i has no such “winning” strategy, then on any path that leads to 
uimax, player j must take a “surrendering” move at some decision node that allows i to ensure 
uimax in the ensuing subgame. As ensuring uimax is the sole undominated strategy for i in the 
subgame, it turns out that any strategy by j that may entail a surrendering move is eliminated 
by two steps of eliminating weakly dominated strategies. Hence, after two steps of 
elimination, it is no longer feasible to reach any terminal node with payoff uimax. Since the 
same is true for player j’s maximum possible payoff ujmax, the first two steps of elimination 
must delete the two extreme outcomes in the game  (unless either i or j had a winning 
strategy).  
This argument can be iterated in a straightforward way. Specifically, when the number 
of outcomes n is odd, i.e., equal to 2m+1 for some m, then one needs at most 2m=n-1 steps to 
arrive at a trivial game. When n is even, i.e., equal to 2m for some m, then the game has at 
most two outcomes left after 2(m-1) steps of elimination, so the game solves in at most 2(m-
1)+1=n-1 steps. Thus, in both cases, n-1 steps are sufficient.  
The application of iterated weak dominance to games of perfect information has been 
studied before. In [5], Gale suggests an equilibrium selection procedure in finite perfect-
information games using iterated dominance arguments. A key contribution is [9], in which 
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Moulin formulates a condition on perfect-information games implying dominance-solvability, 
i.e., that the iterated elimination of all weakly dominated strategies yields a game in which all 
strategy combinations induce the same outcome. The proof uses the fact that backward 
induction reasoning eliminates weakly dominated strategies in every step, though not 
necessarily all of them. The condition formulated by Moulin guarantees that backward 
induction yields a singleton outcome, but also that the order of elimination does not matter, 
implying that iterated weak dominance leads to the same unique outcome as backward 
induction. In [6], Gretlein discovers a gap in Moulin’s proof and closes it using results of a 
companion paper [7]. A frequently cited unpublished working paper [13] by Rochet seems to 
contain results similar to those in [7] (see [4] and [11]). The careful reader of this literature 
will notice that in [10], Moulin attributes the above-mentioned result in [9] to Harold Kuhn. 
The present paper builds upon and extends the main result in [3], which says that any zero-
sum perfect-information game with three outcomes is solvable in two steps.2 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 recalls some standard 
terminology. In Section 3, we present the concept of a surrender strategy and apply it to 
derive the main result. The tightness of the upper bound is shown in Section 4. The appendix 
contains technical proofs. 
 
2. NOTATION 
 
Consider a finite perfect-information game G (for definitions of the standard concepts 
used, we refer the reader to Binmore [2]). Players are denoted by i, j{1,2}, where jzi. Let Xi 
                                                          
2 After this work was completed, we learned of a recent paper by Shimoji [14] that addresses a similar question 
and obtains results similar to ours.  
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denote the set of i’s nodes in G, let Z be the set of terminal nodes, and let X=XiXjZ. A 
move (x,y) is a pair of nodes such that y is an immediate successor of x. A strategy s for player 
i specifies moves at any node xXi. Denote a typical strategy for j by t, and the set of 
strategies for players i and j by S and T, respectively. We say that sS reaches x if there is a 
tT such that the path generated by the profile (s,t) contains x. The utility of player i is 
ui(s,t)=ui(z), where z is the terminal node contained in the path generated by (s,t).  
Throughout the paper, we assume that G is zero-sum, i.e. that ui(s,t)=-uj(s,t) for all s 
and t. In the present context, this is tantamount to saying that the game is strictly competitive, 
i.e. that the elements of the set of outcomes {(ui(s,t),uj(s,t))|sS, tT} can be labeled as 
a1,...,an so that player i prefers an outcome with lower index over an outcome with higher 
index, and vice versa for player j. For any normal-form game N with utility ui(s,t), denote by 
vi(N)= maxs mint ui(s,t) player i’s value or security level in N. Write N=N(G) for the normal 
form of G, and vi(G):= vi(N(G)). It is well known ([8,15]) that vi(G)=-vj(G). We will refer to 
this result as the minmax theorem for PI games. For a node xX, denote by G(x) the subgame 
starting at x, and by vi(x) player i’s value in G(x). A strategy s is a maximin strategy in G if 
ui(s,t)tvi(G) for all tT. We will write uimax for i’s maximum possible payoff 
max{ui(s,t)|sS,tT} in N, and similarly  uimin for min{ui(s,t)|sS,tT}. A strategy s is 
winning if ui(s,t)=uimax for all tT.  
Let T0T be a set of strategies for player j. A strategy sS is (weakly) dominated by 
s’S with respect to T0 if ui(s,t)dui(s’,t) for all tT0, and ui(s,t’)<ui(s’,t’) for some t’T0. A 
strategy sS is (weakly) dominated in N if it is dominated by some s’S with respect to T. 
Denote by D(N) the normal-form game resulting from N by eliminating all strategies, for i and 
j,  that are dominated in N. As usual, write D0(N):=N and Dk(N):=D(Dk-1(N)) for the game 
resulting from k times repeated elimination of weakly dominated strategies. Abusing notation, 
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we write D(S) and Dk(S) for the set of i’s strategies in D(N) and Dk(N), respectively 
(analogously for player j). We say that a normal-form game N has n outcomes if the image of 
the mapping (u1,u2) in 2 has cardinality n. The game N is trivial if it possesses only one 
outcome. 
 
3. SURRENDER STRATEGIES 
 
The main result of the paper says that any zero-sum perfect-information game G with 
n outcomes is dominance solvable in n-1 steps. For an example, consider Figure 1. Here, a 
one-time elimination of weakly dominated strategies reduces G to G’. While this simplifies 
the game, the reader will also notice that the number of outcomes remains unchanged at three. 
It is therefore not possible to employ a direct induction argument on the number of outcomes. 
However, note that an additional step of elimination applied to G’ renders a game with just 
one outcome.  
It turns out that this is true in general. More precisely, it will be shown below that, in 
all relevant cases, two steps of elimination reduce the number of outcomes by at least two. In 
fact, two steps of eliminating dominated strategies delete “extreme” outcomes, characterized 
by the property that they give either player 1 or player 2 her most preferred payoff.  This is 
why the following definition is of interest. Assume that player j does not possess a winning 
strategy in N. Then a surrender strategy for player i in N is a strategy s with the property that 
there exists a strategy t for player j such that uj(s,t) is the maximum possible utility for j in N.  
 
- Figure 1 here - 
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Consider again the example depicted in Figure 1. Playing left at the initial move means a 
surrender for player 1 since, following 1’s move, player 2 may end the game in her optimal 
outcome.  
 
Lemma 1.  Let G be a strictly competitive game of perfect information with normal form N. 
Assume that player j does not possess a winning strategy in Dk(N), for some kt0. Then any 
surrender strategy in Dk(N)  for player i is eliminated by two steps of iterated dominance, i.e., 
it is not contained in Dk+2(N). 
 
The mechanics for this result were explained in the introduction (the proof can be found in the 
appendix). Roughly speaking, the first step of elimination deletes all non-winning strategies 
for j in subgames where j possesses a winning strategy. Then, the second step deletes all 
strategies for i which enable j to reach one of these subgames, i.e., the second step deletes all 
surrender strategies.  
 
Lemma 2.  Let G be a zero-sum game of perfect information, and kt0. Assume that Dk(N) 
possesses only two outcomes. Then Dk+1(N) is trivial. 
 
Proof. By Lemma A.2 in the Appendix, the minmax theorem for PI games is valid also for 
the game Dk(N) (which is not necessarily of perfect information). That is, we have vi(Dk(N))+ 
vj(Dk(N))=0. As vi(Dk(N)) can attain only one of two possible values, either i or j must possess 
a winning strategy in Dk(N). Assume without loss of generality that i has a winning strategy. 
Then, as any strategy for i that is not winning in Dk(N) is weakly dominated, the game 
Dk+1(N) has only one outcome.¶ 
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Given these preparations, the upper bound can be derived as follows. When no player has a 
winning strategy, the elimination of surrender strategies reduces the number of outcomes by 
two. Hence, a fortiori, the two-fold elimination of dominated strategies also reduces the 
number of outcomes by two. Iterating this argument yields our main result. 
 
Theorem 1. Let G be a strictly competitive perfect-information game with n outcomes. Then 
n-1 iterations of eliminating weakly dominated strategies reduce G to a trivial game. 
 
Proof. The assertion follows by induction from Lemma 1 if n is odd. If n is even, apply 
Lemma 1 (n-1)/2 times, and apply Lemma 2 afterwards. ¶ 
 
The proof of this result (especially that of Lemma 1) is more complicated than in the case n=3 
mainly because of two reasons. Firstly, two steps of elimination will typically delete not only 
surrender strategies, but other strategies as well. This makes it difficult to use a more direct 
induction argument. The second complication is that the elimination of weakly dominated 
strategies in a game of perfect information does not necessarily render a perfect information 
game (see [1] for an example), which also precludes the use of a simpler induction argument.  
 
4. TIGHTNESS OF THE UPPER BOUND 
 
For a general finite strictly competitive perfect-information game with n outcomes, it does not 
suffice to perform less than n-1 steps of elimination. An example is Gn in Figure 2, which is a 
variant of Rosenthal’s centipede game (see [12]). The outcomes are a1,...,an, where player 1 
 9 
prefers an outcome with lower index over an outcome with higher index, and vice versa for 
player 2. Consider first the case that n is even (left side of Figure 2). We claim that for player 
1, only the strategy s0 that goes straight through to the outcome an is weakly dominated, and 
that for player 2, no strategy is dominated. To see why, note that in order to determine the 
payoff of a strategy pair, it suffices to distinguish between strategies in terms of the first “exit 
point”. Then, if a strategy s’ exhibits a performance against some strategy t that is strictly 
different from that of another strategy s (which is a necessary condition for a weak dominance 
relationship), then this means that the exit point of t is either between or behind those of s and 
s’. However, if this is the case, then the superiority relation between s and s’ is reversed when 
the exit point of t is moved, either from “between” to “behind,” or vice versa. This is always 
possible unless either s or s’ does not exit at all, i.e., is equal to s0. An analogous argument 
applies when n is odd. It follows that, by identifying certain payoff-equivalent strategies, we 
can “reduce” D(N(Gn)) to N(Gn-1). As this is true for all n, and the operator D(.) preserves the 
above reducibility relation, the game Dn-2(N(Gn)) may be reduced to N(G2), and therefore is 
not trivial. We have proved: 
 
Theorem 2. For any nt2, there exists a zero-sum perfect-information game Gn that is 
dominance solvable in n-1 steps, but not in n-2 steps. 
 
- Figure 2 here - 
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APPENDIX: TECHNICAL PROOFS 
 
Lemma A.1. Let sS. Then there is an s’Dk(S) such that ui(s’,t)t ui(s,t) for all tDk(T). 
 
Proof. By induction on k. If k=0, let s’:=s. Assume the assertion is true for some kt0. Let 
sS. By the induction hypothesis, there is an s’’Dk(S) such that ui(s’’,t)tui(s,t) for all 
tDk(T).  Any element of Dk(S) is either undominated or dominated by an undominated 
strategy (since the relation of weak dominance is acyclic). Therefore we may choose 
s’Dk+1(S) such that ui(s’,t)t ui(s’’,t) for all tDk(T). Putting these inequalities together gives 
ui(s’,t)t ui(s,t) for all tDk(T), which a fortiori holds for all tDk+1(T).¶ 
 
Lemma A.2. If N is the normal form of a zero-sum perfect-information game, we have 
vi(Dk(N))=vi(N) for all kt0. 
 
Proof. By Lemma A.1, 
vi(Dk(N))tvi(N).  (i) 
As N is the normal form of a perfect information game, the minmax theorem implies 
vi(N)+vj(N)=0.  (ii) 
Thus, from (i), 
vi(Dk(N))+vj(Dk(N))t0. (iii) 
On the other hand, clearly vi(Dk(N))+vj(Dk(N))d0 (otherwise, the players could collectively 
achieve more than a zero payoff in Dk(N)). So (iii) is satisfied with equality, and therefore so 
must (i) be.¶ 
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Proof of Lemma 1. Let sDk(S) be a surrender strategy in Dk(N). Then, by definition, there 
exists a tDk(T) so that uj(s,t)=ujmax, where ujmax denotes the maximum possible payoff for j in 
Dk(N). In fact, without loss of generality we may choose tDk+1(T). By assumption, 
vj(Dk(N))<ujmax. Therefore, by Lemma A.2, vj(G)<ujmax. Hence, there is a move (x,y) on the 
path generated by (s,t) so that 
vj(x)<ujmaxdvj(y).  (*) 
As j cannot increase her value by making a move, player i is called upon to play at x. 
Consider strategy s’S for i, equal to s outside G(x), and equal to some maximin strategy in 
G(x). Assume sDk+1(S) (otherwise there is nothing to show). We claim that s’ dominates s 
with respect to Dk+1(T). By Lemma A.1, this is enough to prove the assertion. First we show 
that ui(s’,t’)tui(s,t’) for all t’Dk+1(T). Assume to the contrary that 
ui(s’,t’)<ui(s,t’) (**) 
for some t’Dk+1(T). Note that, because of (**), both (s’,t’) and (s,t’) must reach x. Hence, as 
s’ is maximin for i in G(x), we have ui(s’,t’)tvi(x). Then, again because of (**), we have 
ui(s,t’)>vi(x).  (***) 
Now, (s,t’) reaches y, as i moves at x. But then, we claim, t’ is dominated in Dk(N). For this, 
define t’’T to be equal to t’ outside of G(y) and equal to some maximin strategy in G(y). 
Then uj(s’’,t’’)tuj(s’’,t’) for all s’’Dk(S), because if (s’’,t’’) does not reach y, then 
uj(s’’,t’’)=uj(s’’,t’), and if (s’’,t’’) reaches y, then uj(s’’,t’’)tvj(y)tujmaxtuj(s’’,t’) from (*)). As 
(s,t’’) reaches y, the minmax theorem for PI games, (*) and (***) imply 
uj(s,t’’)t vj(y)>vj(x)=-vi(x)>-ui(s,t’)=uj(s,t’). 
Thus, t’ is dominated by t’’T with respect to Dk(S). But then, by Lemma A.1, strategy t’ is 
dominated in Dk(N), which is a contradiction to our assumption that t’Dk+1(T). Hence (**) 
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cannot hold. It remains to be shown that s’ is sometimes strictly better than s with respect to 
Dk+1(T). We claim that ui(s’,t)>ui(s,t). This is because (s’,t) reaches x, and therefore, by (*) 
and the minmax theorem for PI games,  
ui(s’,t)tvi(x)=-vj(x)>-ujmax=-uj(s,t)=ui(s,t).  
Hence, summing up, s’S dominates s with respect to Dk+1(T). This proves the assertion.¶ 
 
 13 
REFERENCES 
 
1. P. Battigalli, “On Rationalizability in Extensive Games,” Journal of Economic Theory 74 
(1997), 40-61. 
2. K. Binmore, “Fun and Games,” D. C. Heath, Lexington, Massachusetts, 1994. 
3. C. Ewerhart, Chess-Like Games are Dominance-Solvable in at Most Two Steps, Games 
Econ. Beh. 33 (2000), 41-47. 
4. D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole, “Game Theory,” MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1991. 
5. D. Gale, A Theory of N-Person Games with Perfect Information, Proc. Nat. Acad. Sc. 39 
(1953), 496-501. 
6. R. J. Gretlein, Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes: A Comment, Econometrica 50 
(1982), 527-528. 
7. R. J. Gretlein, Dominance Elimination Procedures on Finite Alternative Games, Int. 
Journal of Game Theory 12 (1983), 107-113. 
8. L. Kalmár, Zur Theorie der abstrakten Spiele, Acta Universitatis Szegediensis/Sectio 
Scientiarum Mathematicarum 4 (1928/29), 65-85. 
9. H. Moulin, Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes, Econometrica 47 (1979), 1337-1351. 
10. H. Moulin, “Game Theory for the Social Sciences,” New York, New York University 
Press, 1981. 
11. H. Moulin, “The Strategy of Social Choice,” Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1983.  
12. R. W. Rosenthal, Games of Perfect Information, Predatory Pricing and the Chain-Store 
Paradox, Journal of Economic Theory 25 (1981), 92-100. 
13. J. C. Rochet,  Selection of a Unique Equilibrium Payoff for Extensive Games with Perfect 
Information, unpublished research paper (1980), D. P. CEREMADE, Université Paris IX. 
 14 
14. M. Shimoji, “A Proof for Ewerhart’s Conjecture,” unpublished research paper (2001), 
registered for the North American Meetings in Maryland. 
15. J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern, “Theory of Games and Economic Behavior,” 
Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1944. 
 
 
-32
1
0
2
1
Figure 1. The elimination of dominated strategies need not reduce
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Figure 2. A strictly competitive game of perfect information
with n≥2 outcomes that is dominance solvable in precisely n-1 steps;
the one-time elimination of dominated strategies reduces Gn to Gn-1
(implying a change of sides in the diagram)
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